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FAQ#5: Why Can’t the Chinese Authorities Allow a Little 
Space for Protests during the Olympics? 
July 2, 2008 in Uncategorized by The China Beat | 4 comments 
Of course, the easy answer to this question is: Because there is almost no freedom of assembly 
in China and there are big restrictions on freedom of expression. But I have started to realize that 
this answer is too simple. The people I have been talking to, even well-educated and 
international people, have a gut reaction to the idea of public protests that is unfavorable. 
I have been discussing the issue of protests during the Olympic Games with Chinese colleagues, 
friends, and acquaintances from academic, government, and corporate backgrounds. The people 
whose views I summarize here are college-educated (in China), middle-class, internationally-
informed (but not educated abroad), and between the ages of 30 and 55. I would guess that their 
political stance is close to the mainstream (though since Chinese people don’t vote for top 
leaders, there’s no clear barometer of their political stances like “Republican” or “Democrat”). 
Some of them expressed that the protests surrounding the torch relay presented a new view of the 
West, because they did not fully understand that such protests are common there. My guess is 
that while they knew about them, perhaps they had never seen so many visual images on TV and 
in the media. However, it seems to me that the way in which this coverage was handled 
in China left many people with the false impression that protests like these occur 
in London and Paris nearly every day, a portrait they regard with distaste. Let me to try to outline 
the system of beliefs that produces this reaction. 
First, there is the cultural background of host-guest relations. There is a highly-refined protocol 
between a host and a guest in China; this also extends to Chinese conventions for the expression 
of mutual respect between states, which historically were more highly developed than that of the 
West. Chinese people see large sporting events as part of the cycle of host-guest reciprocity: 
when I host a major sport event, I invite you to my home as my guest, and there I put you in the 
seat of honor, feed you the special foods and give you the special gifts unique to my 
hometown. The cultural performances in the Olympic opening ceremonies are said to be like the 
unique foods that you receive as my guest, which are not available in your hometown. In the 
summer of 2006 He Zhenliang, China’s senior member in the International Olympic Committee, 
spoke passionately to me about hosts and guests when I interviewed him for an essay that the 
IOC had invited me to write for their official magazine, The Olympic Review. [Lest readers of 
my previous post think that the censorship practiced by the Foreign Languages Press is unique to 
China, I will note that that essay was ultimately cut down to 1/3 of its original length, 
eliminating, among other things, this entire section, which I did not directly attribute to him. So I 
published it in the final chapter of my recent book,Beijing’s Games: What the Olympics Mean 
to China.] 
For Mr. He, the Beijing Games were China’s opportunity to return the hospitality of the other 
host nations who had previously invited China into their homes, and to welcome the world as a 
guest to China’s home. He anticipated that there would be negative Western media coverage and 
he explained to me that Chinese people see this as disrespectful, because it is as if the host 
invited a guest to his home and the guest responded by criticizing the host. He cited Pierre de 
Coubertin’s notion of “le respect mutuel,” and stated that journalism that serves the West’s 
appetite for “curiosities” – highlighting China’s differences with the West rather than its 
commonalities, its deficiencies rather than its accomplishments – is disrespectful toChina and to 
the Olympic ideals. 
In conversations with more average Chinese people I have encountered the same reaction. In the 
Chinese tradition, host-guest meetings are highly ritualized and ceremonial, and are not supposed 
to be occasions for straightforward debate. Or, put another way, the Olympic Games are an 
occasion when the guest should respect the “face” of the host. The image of protests taking place 
outside the Bird’s Nest Stadium, where a splendid ceremony of international friendship is 
supposed to be taking place, would be “ugly” or “not good to look at” (不好看)。Everyone 
recognizes that this means they are engaging in “appearance-ism” (形式主义), which is said to 
be a key feature of Chinese society (sometimes jokingly, sometimes with some bitterness). The 
proverb that “family shame should not be made public” （家丑不可外扬）is often quoted to 
express it. As one of my colleagues put it: It’s like when there is a wedding in the 
family. Actually, the members of the family do not get along with each other. But they put on a 
show for outsiders during the wedding. I noted that Americans have similar feelings, but she 
countered by stating that Chinese people have particularly strong feelings about this. As a result, 
if someone chooses to disrupt the proceedings, it is an indicator that the internal conflicts are so 
great that the collective is threatened.And in China this is a thought that seems to evoke fear. 
Needless to say, this is the context within which protests by Chinese Tibetans during the 
Olympic Games would be judged. Perhaps this is one reason that the Dalai Lama, who should 
understand Chinese culture well enough to know this, has recently come out with strong 
statements against the disruption of the Olympic Games through protests. 
An acquaintance who has a degree in international relations further observed that in China the 
custom is to first invite the guest to your home to allow him/her to “understand” you and build 
trust, and only later to try to talk through differences.“Mutual understanding” （互相理
解） facilitates the later negotiations. To try to work out all differences ahead of time would be 
ridiculous. I probably don’t need to add that this particular custom is one that many Westerners 
are forced to learn in dealing with Chinese partners – but having been forced to learn it, they find 
that it is actually a better way of forming human relations. It is also probably a more accurate 
description of what is happening through the Beijing Olympic Games – they are more accurately 
perceived as the starting point for a closer relationship between China and the outside world than 
a nuptial ceremony marking a permanent intimate bond. 
A related factor is the negative Chinese attitude toward criticism. On this point, cultural 
differences with the West are difficult to pinpoint because there are many frames in which 
Chinese people seem freer with criticism than Westerners. For example, a friend who runs into 
you on the sidewalk will say, “Your expression is bad,” or “Have you put on weight?” The 
Xinhua sport reporter Qu Beilin has written a series of essays in the past year trying to help 
Chinese people understand Westerners because, having covered the 1993 and 2001 IOC Sessions 
that voted on Beijing’s Olympic bids, he had an urgent intuition that China did not understand 
the West and it had better try to do so before the Beijing Games. In his essays, a recurring theme 
is that the reason Chinese people don’t understand what Westerners really think about them is 
that Westerners are too polite to criticize you to your face. Nevertheless, Chinese people 
generally seem to feel that “critics” are negatively regarded in China. Yi Jiandong, whose blog I 
translated in one of my earlier posts, said that the tagline on his blogsite, “Yi Jiandong’s space: 
an independent critical voice, realizing the value of constructive action, growing along with the 
Olympics,” had largely received negative reactions because readers do not understand how a 
critical voice can be socially constructive. He noted that his student evaluations often judge him 
harshly for the critical views that he presents in his classes, because they consider it arrogant to 
put oneself morally above others and criticize them. He observed that a common attitude toward 
criticism is that it “undermines the collective.” 
People in official leadership positions very often do not grasp the concept that criticism can have 
a constructive function, either, and that is why they do not appreciate the watchdog function that 
a free media could play if it were free to criticize them. Even less so do they appreciate that 
Western media criticism ofChina could have a constructive function. I feel that in evaluating 
their viewpoints it is important to keep in mind that the current cohort of leadership 
in China which is 50-60 years old came of age during the Cultural Revolution, when they were 
exposed to practices of extreme criticism which were very destructive. A constructive response 
to criticism is based on mutual trust. As a teacher, I have noticed that most of my students must 
learn to engage with and respond to criticism rather than to get angry and retreat, which seems to 
be the human knee-jerk reaction. There is a generation of people in power in China right now in 
whom a healthy approach to criticism may never have been cultivated. 
There is also a pragmatic reason that my Chinese acquaintances do not think that “protest zones” 
are feasible. They all subscribe to what I might call the “powder-keg” theory of Chinese 
society. They feel that because of growing inequities Chinese society is unstable, and that one 
public protest could ignite another and another, and soon the whole country would be protesting 
and everything would collapse. That in the West it might be common for one group to hold 
public protests while everyone else just walks by on their way to work is hard to 
comprehend. They state that the problem of “surrounding onlookers” （围观）is common 
in China. If there were a protest zone outside the Bird’s Nest Stadium, soon a crowd would 
gather. Before you know it, you’d have a riot. 
I have to admit that I have some sympathy to this view. In the 1980s I was trapped three different 
times in Chinese crowds that were on the verge of losing control, and it was a scary 
experience. But crowds seem much better-behaved these days, and anyway no security forces 
were present on those occasions.Westerners see protest zones as a way of ensuring that 
demonstrations are controlled and do not lead to widespread rioting, but my Chinese respondents 
did not hold this view, and across the board felt that they would spark rioting rather than control 
it. They also do not subscribe to the Western theory that allowing a space for protest can defuse a 
conflict by “letting off steam.” One colleague argued that the custom of protesting is different 
in China, and that Chinese only protest when they have been pushed to the point of no 
return. Therefore it is not possible for protests to perform the function of “venting” （发泄） on 
a limited scale. My acquaintances stated that the social problems facing China today are too 
complex to be solved immediately and that is why it would be better to keep the lid on protests 
for the near future. They felt that continued rapid economic development is the only hope for the 
resolution of these problems. 
Several of the people I talked to said that the only way “protest zones” could be implemented 
would be if they were located in an isolated area away from the events, as was the case for the 
1995 NGO meetings in Huairou. I noted with interest June 9 reports stating that, starting in July, 
the Beijing government had decided to relocate provincial residents coming to Beijing to petition 
government offices into the World Park in Fengtai, a 6.7-hectare amusement park with reduced-
scale displays of 50 countries. “Beijing news revealed that how to handle the petitioners from 
various places venting their dissatisfaction had all along been a difficult key problem for the 
security of the Beijing Olympics.” The report further stated that “this measure imitates the model 
of England’s ‘Hyde Park’; in the ‘World Park,’ petitioners can carry out speeches, protests and 
demonstrations, demonstrating that the authorities are “people-oriented” (以人为本) and respect 
human rights, and at the same time avoiding disturbing the conduct of the Olympic Games.” The 
petitioners would be given food and drink inside the park. I might mention that when I raised the 
question of protest with The China Beat’s co-organizer Jeff Wasserstrom, an expert on Chinese 
protests, he mentioned Hyde Park’s “Speaker’s Corner” as a possible alternative to the Salt Lake 
City model. I’m not qualified to assess whether this actually demonstrates any progress in human 
rights: one of my Chinese colleagues did feel it was good that petitioners had been given their 
own space, while Western journalists think that it is an attempt to “disappear” them. 
What interests me is the rather unusual choice of location. It evokes the amusing idea that any 
foreigners who apply for permission to protest during the Olympic Games might be given a time 
and space at the World Park, perhaps even in front of their own country’s exhibit, where they 
would be just another exotic performance. This somewhat reflects the spirit in which my Chinese 
friend recalls the protest demonstrations at the NGO meeting site in Huairou during the 1995 UN 
Women’s Conference. Based on my discussions, I feel that this is one of the few places where 
protests by foreigners could be acceptable to those in charge ofBeijing’s Olympic security as 
well as to the average middle-class Chinese person.Conversely, if the authorities allowed a space 
for unruly protests near the main sports events, public opinion would probably be against it. 
I would like to make clear that what I have tried to do here is to outline common Chinese 
attitudes about public protests during the Beijing Olympics. These ideas are not my own and I 
am not saying that they are accurate from a social-scientific perspective – but that is another 
question. And I have not analyzed the real power differences and political structure that are 
another important part of the picture – people in leadership positions don’t have to accept media 
criticism because their job security depends almost entirely on the leaders above them who 
appointed them and not on public transparency. However, it seems to me that this political 
structure is at least partly supported by a cultural context that is not supportive of public protests 
such as are common in the West. 
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